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This study tests for a migration response to the implementation
of stricter rules for welfare bene￿t receipt, in the form of mandatory
participation in activation programs for welfare recipients, in Stock-
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than they value the contents of the program, and vice versa. The
results give some indications of a negative e⁄ect of the program on
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dications that activation programs lead to outmigration of welfare
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2 IFAU ￿E⁄ects of work requirements on welfare migration1 Introduction
The increasing numbers of welfare bene￿t recipients has given rise to a
new trend in the welfare bene￿t policy of the Western world, in the form
of a shift in focus from the rights to the obligations of recipients of welfare.
In the U.S., as well as in many European countries, policies have been im-
plemented that restrict the availability of welfare bene￿ts, for example by
introducing time limits or by conditioning bene￿t receipt on participation
in job search or job training programs. Such policies are often described
by the term "workfare", since they require that the recipients to some
extent work for their welfare bene￿ts (see e.g. Blomberg et al. (2006)).
Sweden is no exception to this trend. In 1998, a change in the Social
Service Act enabled local municipalities and town districts to strengthen
the rules for bene￿t eligibility, by conditioning bene￿t receipt on particip-
ation in programs for job search and job training. The law has been used
by several municipalities and town districts to implement a new type of
labour market program for recipients of welfare bene￿ts that are capable
of working, so called activation programs. The implementation of such
programs is highly decentralized: the municipalities, or, in case of larger
towns, the town districts, are responsible for the decision of whether or
not to start a program, as well as for the program design.
Welfare caseloads have fallen dramatically in many town districts that
have implemented activation programs, something that is often interpreted
as a sign of success of the activation policy. However, no study has yet
con￿rmed that it is the activation programs that have increased the em-
ployment rates among recipients of welfare1, and there is in fact little
information on what happens to the individuals that end the program.
For example, a survey on the Stockholm town district Sk￿rholmen points
out that information on the cause for ending the activation program is
lacking for as much of 56% of the participants, and that only 18% state
that they are employed after the program (see ThorØn (2005)). Similar ￿g-
ures are given in Ekstr￿m (2005), who studies the same town district and
also notes that the third most common category is "having moved from
the town district": 11% state this as the cause for ending the program.
We hence do not know if the activation programs have helped parti-
1 While there have been a number of evaluations of single activation programs, these
have been descriptive in character, and have not been able to isolate program e⁄ects
from for example business cycle e⁄ects.
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to other factors, such as improved labour market conditions in general or
even to outmigration of welfare prone individuals from municipalities and
districts that have implemented stricter activation policies.
This paper tests if the implementation of activation programs in Stock-
holm town districts a⁄ected the moving choices of welfare prone individu-
als. The fact that the implementation of such programs increases the
obligations of recipients of welfare, suggests that it would increase the
likelihood that welfare prone individuals move from a town district that
has an activation program. However, it is also possible that the services
of the program are appreciated by the participants, and that the e⁄ect on
migration goes the other way. The expected aggregate e⁄ect on migration
is hence unknown, and depends on how the individuals value the stricter
rules and loss of leisure time against the services of the program. If a large
share of the target population avoids the program by moving, the e⁄ect-
iveness of the program to reduce welfare bene￿t dependency is naturally
diminished. Evaluating whether this is the case is therefore interesting
from a policy perspective.
An important prerequisite for the hypothesis of welfare migration is
that welfare prone individuals are not restricted from moving, for example
due to housing constraints. Considering the tight housing market in the
Stockholm area, this is an important issue for this study. However, looking
at the sample of this study, we see that welfare prone individuals seem to
be even more mobile than the rest of the population: 9 percent of the
individuals that receive welfare bene￿ts at some point during the year,
move between town districts during the year, while the corresponding
￿gure for those that do not receive bene￿ts is 6.4 percent.2
The previous literature on migration responses to local welfare be-
ne￿t policy, has in general focused on the e⁄ects of di⁄erences in local
welfare bene￿t generosity, and often use American state level data. The
evidence of this literature is mixed: some studies estimate large welfare
migration, while other studies report no e⁄ects.3. The results from the
recent, methodologically more credible, studies, however suggest that wel-
fare generosity does a⁄ect migration, but that the e⁄ect is rather small
(see e.g. McKinnish (2005) and McKinnish (2007), Gelbach (2004), and
2 For reasons that are given in footnote 16, individuals that have immigrated to
Sweden during the last three years are excluded from the sample.
3 See Meyer (2000) and Mo¢ tt (1992) for overviews of the early literature.
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e⁄ects when studying Norwegian municipalities.
The only previous paper, to my knowledge, that tests for migration
responses to stricter rules for welfare bene￿t eligibility is Kaestner et al.
(2001), who test if the introduction of time limits, ￿nancial sanctions
for non-compliance, and strict work eligibility rules in US states a⁄ected
outmigration from the state. They compare the migration response among
groups of women that di⁄er in the propensity to receive welfare bene￿ts,
and ￿nd that the use of time limits increased outmigration among welfare
prone individuals. No separate e⁄ects could however be estimated for
￿nancial sanction or work exemption policies, since the states using such
policies were also using time limits.
In contrast to other studies of welfare migration, Kaestner et al. (2001)
also study the situation after migration has taken place, as a further test
of the cause for moving. Interestingly, they ￿nd that many of those that
moved from the more strict states, were employed after the move. This
result may suggest increased labour market mobility in the states that have
implemented the stricter rules. However, an alternative explanation is that
the moves were not at all related to di⁄erences in the welfare bene￿t policy,
but rather to di⁄erent employment possibilities. For example, it can be the
case that jurisdictions that experience a declining economic situation are
more willing implement stricter welfare bene￿t rules. If so, moves that look
like welfare migration may in fact be motivated by an unfavorable labor
market. This highlights the di¢ culties of controlling for other factors that
a⁄ect migration. However, controlling for the characteristics of all possible
moving-combinations is in general not feasible.
In this study, there is no need to control for varying labour market
characteristics of the local jurisdictions, since all individuals live within
the same municipality, i.e. in the same local labour market area. An
individual who ￿nds a job in another town district does not have to move,
since one can easily commute within the municipality. For the purpose
of this study, it is also important to point out that all individuals face
the same welfare bene￿t level, since this is set at the municipal level. By
limiting the analysis to Stockholm town districts, we minimize the risk of
omitted variable bias due to di⁄erences in local characteristics, and can
hence pinpoint the e⁄ect of work requirements on migration. In addition,
the fact that merely a short-distance move is necessary in order to end up
under a di⁄erent bene￿t policy, makes the migration hypothesis a plausible
IFAU ￿E⁄ects of work requirements on welfare migration 5story. It is for example likely that individuals are better informed of
the welfare bene￿t policies of the town districts in the vicinity, and that
moving costs are lower for short-distance moves.
The fact that the starting year of the activation programs di⁄ers among
the town districts in our sample, means that two sources of variation can
be exploited to identify the e⁄ect of the program on the moving choices
of welfare prone individuals. First, we can compare the moving choices
of welfare prone individuals before and after the law revision, in town
districts that did and did not start an activation program after the revision,
in a district-level di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences analysis. Second, we can add a
further component to the analysis, and compare the migration di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erences estimates for groups that di⁄er in the propensity to receive
welfare bene￿ts. The idea is that the moving behaviour of individuals with
a high propensity to use welfare will be a⁄ected by the programs, while
individuals that are not welfare prone will not be a⁄ected. Combining this
approach with the district level analysis yields a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erences estimator. This approach gives good possibilities to control
for the e⁄ects of unobserved trends that a⁄ect migration. This is an
advantage, compared to most other studies of welfare migration, which
rely on comparison group based di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences analysis.
The results of this study give some indications of a negative migration
response to the activation programs among welfare prone individuals; i.e.
welfare prone individuals are less likely to move from the town district,
compared to less welfare prone groups, when there is an activation program
in place. This is contrary to the positive welfare migration e⁄ects that
are found in most previous studies. However, the result is not robust to
changes in comparison group nor to changes in the sample of town districts.
The conclusion that can be drawn from the study is hence that there are
at least no indications that the activation programs lead to outmigration
of welfare prone individuals.
The outline of the remaining paper is as follows: section 2 describes
the background of the activation programs, section 3 provides a simple
theoretical framework for the e⁄ects of the activation program on migra-
tion, and section 4 describes the data and the de￿nition of comparison
groups. Section 5 contains a description of the empirical speci￿cation,
section 6 provides a graphical analysis, and section 7 shows the results.
Finally, section 8 concludes.
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This section will give a short background and description of the activation
programs. As was described in the introduction, the starting point for the
implementation of the programs was the 1998 revision of the Social Service
Act. The Act gave town districts and municipalities increased authority
to demand that recipients of welfare participate in activities such as job
training or other labour market related activities.4 The law was ￿rst
and foremost intended for young persons under the age of 25, but has in
practise been applied to all individuals capable of working, regardless of
age (see Socialstyrelsen (2005)).
The new regulation has been used by several town districts and mu-
nicipalities to implement activation programs5. These are targeted to
recipients of welfare that are capable of working, and generally consist of
scheduled job search combined with job training. Non-compliance with
the program requirements results in total or partial withdrawal of welfare
bene￿ts.
Local labour market programs for recipients of welfare existed also
before the revision of the Social Service Act. What di⁄erentiates the ac-
tivation programs from the previous programs is ￿rst and foremost the
clear connection between program participation and receipt of welfare be-
ne￿ts. In addition, while the previous programs were often targeted to
some subgroup of bene￿t recipients, such as immigrant women, the new
activation programs in general encompass all recipients of welfare that are
able to work.
As described in the previous section, this paper focuses on the town
districts in the municipality of Stockholm. During the period under study
there are 18 town districts in Stockholm6, each of which is run by a polit-
ical board. The town district is the lowest administrative unit, and is
responsible for the implementation of the greater part of municipal ser-
vices, including social services. The welfare bene￿t norm is however set at
the municipal level, and is hence the same across all town districts in our
sample. It is only whether the town district has an activation program
4 See 4-5§ in the 4th chapter of the Social Service Act (SoL 2001:453).
5 Salonen and Ulmestig (2004) estimate that there were about 800 programmes of
this type in 2002, which means that a municipality often has several di⁄erent types of
programs. For example, there is often a special program for young persons under the
age of 25.
6 In 2007 the number of town districts was reduced to 14.
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of bene￿ts received. This means that we can identify e⁄ects on migration
of stricter rules for bene￿t eligibility separately from e⁄ects of di⁄erent
bene￿t generosity.
Since the detailed contents of the activation programs vary across town
districts, it is di¢ cult to give a detailed over-all picture of the activation
programs in our sample. However, we will here give a short description
of one of the most well-known cases, the activation program of the town
district Sk￿rholmen, in order to illustrate the contents of a typical activ-
ation program. Sk￿rholmen was one of the ￿rst town districts to start an
activation program, and has served as model for other town districts and
municipalities.
The Sk￿rholmen activation program requires participants to spend 3
hours daily in program activities, in a rotating schedule that alternates
between mornings and afternoons, in order to complicate black work out-
side the program. The ￿rst period in the program is spent on individual
job search in the facilities of the program. How long this is varies between
individuals. Some individuals, who are assessed to be in need of job train-
ing, leave for job training/practise almost immediately, while others may
spend up to a maximum of 3 months in job search. Each participant is
assigned a personal job coach, who provides individual job search assist-
ance. The program furthermore provides computers for job search on the
internet and for writing job applications, and the participants can use
telephone and envelopes and postal stamps free of charge. If the program
participant fails to ￿nd a job during this period, he/she gets a job train-
ing proposal from the program o¢ cials. This can be in the street cleaning
team or some other activity that is arranged within the program, or it can
be at an ordinary workplace. There is no limit on the time period that an
individual can participate in the program.7
Activation programs in other town districts are similar to the Sk￿rhol-
men case in the broad design of the program. However, features such as
the required attendance varies across districts. This will be more discussed
in section 4.2, which describes how the data on activation programs was
collected and de￿ned.
This section has given an overview of the activation programs in the
Stockholm municipality. In the next section, we will analyze their potential
7 See e.g. Ekstr￿m (2005) and ThorØn (2005).
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3 Theoretical framework
In order to analyze how the utility of a recipient of welfare bene￿ts is af-
fected by the introduction of an activation program, we develop a simple
two-period model. In the model, the individual is either unemployed and
receives welfare bene￿ts, or is employed and receives a wage.8 The activ-
ation program is assumed to a⁄ect the utility of a recipient of welfare in
two ways: ￿rst, by decreasing the leisure time available to the individual,
and second, by increasing the probability of ￿nding a job in the next time
period.
We start by assuming that the utility level for an individual who is
unemployed and receives welfare bene￿ts, in the case of no activation
program, depends solely on the amount of leisure time, l, and the welfare
bene￿t level, b:
Ui = u(l;b); (1)
while an individual who has a job and does not receive welfare bene￿ts
has the following utility level:
Ui = u(l ￿ h;y): (2)
In equation (2), the amount of leisure is reduced with the time spent
working, h, which is assumed to be constant, and y is the net of tax wage
income, where y > b is assumed to hold. Having a job hence gives a higher
income but also reduces the leisure time.
Let us assume that the individual is an unemployed recipient of welfare
bene￿ts in period one, with a probability of having a job in period two
equal to p. We assume that time preferences are captured by the individual
time discount factor ￿i, and write the expected two-period utility as:
Ui = ut(l;b) +
1
1 + ￿i
[put+1(l ￿ h;y) + (1 ￿ p)ut+1(l;b)] (3)
8 We hence assume that a recipient of welfare bene￿ts does not work. This is a
reasonable assumption, since the activation programs are directed to unemployed in-
dividuals. In addition, during 1994-2003, among all individuals in the municipality of
Stockholm, aged 18-65, the share of employed among those that received welfare be-
ne￿ts at least some time during the year was 31%, to be compared to 77% among the
corresponding population that did not recieve welfare bene￿ts at any time during the
year.
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level of our representative individual? The program a⁄ects the individual
utility in two ways: First, it reduces the leisure time in case of unemploy-
ment by g, which is the time spent in the program. Second, participation
in the program increases the probability of ￿nding a job through the job
search and job training activities, so p is also a function of the time spent
in the program, g:
Ui = ut(l ￿ g;b) +
1
1 + ￿i
[p(g)ut+1(l ￿ h;y) + (1 ￿ p(g))ut+1(l ￿ g;b)]
(4)
The e⁄ect of the program on the utility level of the individual is shown
in equation (5), where equation (4) is di⁄erentiated with respect to g. In
period one, there is a negative e⁄ect through the reduction in the amount
of leisure time. In period two, there are however both positive and negative
e⁄ects: the increased probability of ￿nding a job and hence having a
higher income has a positive e⁄ect on the utility level, whereas if the
individual remains on welfare bene￿t the e⁄ect in period 2 is negative,
as in period 1, through the reduction in leisure time. If the utility levels
in case of unemployment and employment are equal, i.e. equations (1)
and (2) equal, the e⁄ect is unambiguously negative, while if the utility of
working is higher, the total e⁄ect can be either positive or negative. It can
be noted that the more the individual values current against future utility,
re￿ ected in a higher value of ￿i, the more relative weight will be given to
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Unless the positive and the negative e⁄ects cancel, the introduction
of an activation program in the jurisdiction is hence expected to a⁄ect
the utility level of the individual, negatively or positively. Will this a⁄ect
the moving pattern of welfare prone individuals? If the utility-di⁄erential
between living in a town district with and without an activation program
is su¢ ciently large to outweigh the cost of moving, it is possible that the
introduction of activation programs in some of the town districts will give
rise to migration of the welfare-receiving population.
10 IFAU ￿E⁄ects of work requirements on welfare migrationWe will then see more moves from the districts that have activation
programs if the total e⁄ect on utility is negative, and to the same districts
if the total e⁄ect on utility is positive. This is illustrated in equation (6),
which shows the utility levels of town districts A and B, where B has
an activation program, while A does not. The moving cost is denoted
c. Importantly, since all town districts belong to the same labour market
as well as have the same bene￿t level, so that y and b are the same in
all districts, nothing else is assumed to a⁄ect the moving choices of the
individuals. That is, it is only the presence of the activation program, g,
that di⁄ers between UB and UA.
If Ui
B ￿ Ui
A > c =) move to district B; and v:v: (6)
=
￿
uB;t(l ￿ g;b) +
1
1 + ￿i







[puA;t+1(l ￿ h;y) + (1 ￿ p)ut+1(l;b)]
￿
> c
Can we say anything about which result is more probable in practise
￿migration to of from a town district that has an activation program?
Blomberg et al. (2006) have studied the attitudes among activation pro-
gram participants in six Stockholm town districts, ￿ve out of which are
included in the analysis of this paper. Their survey results give a mixed
picture: while around half of the respondents are over-all positive to the
services of the programs, the beliefs in the possibilities of the program to
actually help them ￿nd a job is quite low: over half of the respondents
think that the possibilities of the program to help them ￿nd a job are
"very small" or "quite small". Less than a third believe that the chances
of getting a job have increased due to the program. Furthermore, about
40 percent state that they would not take part in the program if particip-
ation were not mandatory for bene￿t receipt, while 30 percent state that
they would.
The attitudes among participants also seem to vary between town dis-
tricts. The results in Blomberg et al. (2006) suggests that the residents in
Sk￿rholmen are most dissatis￿ed with the activation program. Consider-
ing the ￿ndings in ThorØn (2005), one might suspect that this is due to a
lack of resources. She argues that the personal job-search coaches in the
activation program of Sk￿rholmen have too many clients and that there
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case, there may even be negative e⁄ects of program participation on the
probability of ￿nding a job in this case.
4 Data
The study uses individual register data, which contains information on
the amount of welfare bene￿ts received, age, sex, country of birth, edu-
cation level, disposable income, family situation (civil status and number
of children), and employment status for all individuals aged 18￿ 659. The
data covers 10 years of pooled cross-sections during the period 1994￿ 2003.
This section starts by describing the data collection and de￿nition of the
activation programs, and continues with describing the town districts of
the sample, as well as the target and comparison groups that are used in
the analysis.
4.1 Activation programs
The information that is used in this study to de￿ne the starting year of
the activation programs was gathered in a survey to the social service
units in all town districts in the municipality of Stockholm. The survey
contains questions on the starting year and basic contents of the activation
programs, as well as on local labour market programs for recipients of
welfare that were in place during the years preceding the revision of the
Social Service Act.10 The surveys were in most cases complemented with
telephone interviews.11
Based on the survey information, we de￿ne a town district as having an
activation program if it has a program: 1) that has scheduled activity daily
or almost daily; 2) that encompasses all individuals capable of working;
and 3) where receipt of welfare bene￿ts is strictly conditional on program
participation.
Table 1 shows the starting year and minimum hours of weekly attend-
ance of the activation programs in the town districts of our sample. The
9 Data on individuals comes from Statistics Sweden.
10 The survey form can be found in the appendix.
11 Additional information was obtained for the following town districts: Kista,
Rinkeby, Sp￿nga-Tensta, H￿sselby-V￿llingby, Enskede-¯rsta, Farsta, Vant￿r, H￿gersten
and Sk￿rholmen.
12 IFAU ￿E⁄ects of work requirements on welfare migrationsix richest town districts of the municipality are excluded from the ana-
lysis, since the share of welfare recipients in these districts is very low12. In
addition, one town district, Skarpn￿ck, is excluded due to the di¢ culties
of de￿ning a starting year for the activation program. The sample hence
consists of 11 town districts.
Table 1: Starting year and weekly required attendance of activation pro-
grams












￿The activation program in Sk￿rholmen started on a small scale in the autumn
of 1998. From 1999, the program however operated at a large scale, which is why we
choose this as the starting year.
￿￿Sp￿nga-Tensta had an ambitious local labour market program in place during
1997-2000, although this cannot be characterized as an activation program. We therefore
test the robustness of the results for the exclusion of Sp￿nga-Tensta throughout the
analysis.
As can be seen in the table, the required hours of attendance varies
signi￿cantly between the town districts, and it is therefore possible that
the migration e⁄ects of the program varies between districts. We will take
account of this in the analysis by, in addition to using the full sample of
town districts, also estimate the migration regression for only two town
districts: one with a strict activation program, and one with no program
during the period.
12 These are Kungsholmen, Norrmalm, ￿stermalm, Maria-Gamla Stan, Katarina-
So￿a and Bromma.
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of required attendance have implemented activation programs during the
last year of the sample period, 2003, or even outside of the sample period.
These will be used as control groups for having no activation program in
the regressions (this is the case for example for Enskede-¯rsta and Vant￿r,
where only 4 hours of weekly attendance is required).
4.2 Town districts
For the empirical investigation, it is important to know if there are large
di⁄erences between the town districts that need to be considered in the
analysis. This section therefore gives a short description of the 11 town
districts in the study.13
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for a set of socioeconomic charac-
teristics for the town districts in the sample. The variables are based on
our register data on individuals aged 18￿ 65, and show the average values
over the period 1994￿ 2003. Welfare denotes the share of the individuals
that received welfare bene￿ts at some point during the year, Move out is
the share that moved from the town district to some other district within
the municipality of Stockholm, Pop 18￿ 65 is the number of individuals
aged 18￿ 65, and Immigr shows the share of individuals that are born out-
side Sweden. Disp Income is the average disposable income of inhabitants
in the town district, and Empl denotes the share of inhabitants that are
employed.
As can be seen in the table it was generally the poorer town districts,
with high rates of welfare recipients, low employment rates and a high
share of immigrant population, that started activation programs early
on. This suggests that it may be important to control for district-speci￿c
factors that can have a⁄ected the decision to start a program and that are
at the same time correlated with migration. As will be further discussed
below, we will use several di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences based approaches that
control for town district-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects and town district-speci￿c
time trends. In addition, district-speci￿c covariates for the share of im-
migrant population, average disposable income and employment level will
be included in some of the speci￿cations.
13 As was mentioned in the previous section, the six richest town districts are excluded
from the analysis, since the shares of welfare recipients in these districts are very low,
and one town district, Skarpn￿ck, is excluded due to the di¢ culties of de￿ning a starting
year for the activation program.
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Town District Welfare Move Pop Immigr Disp Empl
out 18￿ 65 Income
Rinkeby 0.35 0.07 86,855 0.80 83,500 0.41
Sk￿rholmen 0.14 0.06 169,228 0.42 118,500 0.64
Kista 0.17 0.05 174,231 0.53 120,600 0.63
Farsta 0.11 0.05 243,016 0.21 133,200 0.71
˜lvsj￿ 0.05 0.06 112,856 0.15 147,400 0.78
Sp￿nga-Tensta 0.18 0.06 188,605 0.47 122,700 0.63
Liljeholmen 0.07 0.09 180,212 0.18 142,300 0.74
H￿gersten 0.06 0.07 168,880 0.17 144,700 0.75
H￿sselby-V￿llingby 0.07 0.05 322,649 0.20 145,000 0.76
Enskede-¯rsta 0.06 0.08 258,024 0.18 145,200 0.76
Vant￿r 0.13 0.07 192,120 0.28 126,700 0.69
4.3 Target and comparison groups
As discussed the in the introduction, we will follow the previous literat-
ure on welfare migration and compare the moving choices of more and
less welfare prone individuals. How shall the more welfare prone target
groups and the less welfare prone comparison groups be de￿ned? Meyer
(2000) points out that one should avoid de￿ning the target and comparison
groups based on actual bene￿t receipt, since this can give rise to so called
participation bias. This type of bias arises since the payo⁄ of applying for
welfare bene￿ts varies with the bene￿t policy of the jurisdiction. In the
case of our town districts, it is possible that applying for welfare bene￿ts
is less attractive in town districts that have an activation program, since
bene￿t receipt in this case requires active participation in the program.
This means that individuals that did not receive welfare bene￿ts in a more
strict town district, may choose to apply for bene￿ts once they are in a less
strict district, even though the motives for moving there were not related
to the local welfare bene￿t policy.
Most studies deal with this type of bias by de￿ning target and com-
parison groups that di⁄er in welfare propensity based on characteristic
that are not a⁄ected by the welfare bene￿t generosity. We follow this
approach and compare the migration responses to di⁄erences in welfare
bene￿t policy in several groups that di⁄er in the likelihood of being recipi-
ents of welfare bene￿ts. The hypothesis is that more welfare-prone groups
will respond to policy di⁄erentials by moving, while individuals that are
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Ideally, we would like to compare individuals that are similar in every
sense but the likelihood to seek welfare bene￿ts. However, if we make
the comparison groups too similar, we risk to also eliminate di⁄erences
in welfare-propensity. We hence face a trade-o⁄: on the one hand we
want the groups to be su¢ ciently similar to eliminate the risk for omitted
variable bias, on the other hand, su¢ ciently di⁄erent to capture di⁄er-
ences in welfare-propensity. The same trade-o⁄ applies to the question of
how many individual covariates that shall be included in the regressions.
We want to control for all characteristics that di⁄er between the groups
and that may a⁄ect the moving decision, but not for important determin-
ants for the likelihood of receiving welfare. Our strategy is to use several
comparison groups, which di⁄er from the welfare prone group to varying
degrees, and to show results both with and without individual covariates.
As suggested by Meyer (1995) using several comparison groups can
also be useful as a means to reduce the risk of bias due to unobserved
group-speci￿c trends. The idea is that if the comparison groups are suf-
￿ciently di⁄erent from each other, then we can also expect them to yield
di⁄erent biases. Similar results from di⁄erent comparison groups hence
strengthen the case that the result is due to the introduction of the activ-
ation program, and not just the e⁄ect of some omitted factor. However,
the fact that we want all comparison groups to be comparable to the tar-
get group, as previously discussed, naturally puts a limit to how much the
comparison groups can di⁄er.
Based on these considerations, we de￿ne a set of target and control
groups, based on factors that a⁄ect the probability to receive welfare be-
ne￿ts, but that are not a⁄ected by the welfare bene￿t policy. In addition,
we base our comparison groups on factors that predict long-term welfare
dependency. According to our data, and to Spahic (2002), an individual
is more likely to be a long-term welfare recipient if he/she is: young,
foreign-born; a single mother; low-educated; or socially unstable, for ex-
ample being a drug addict or su⁄ering from mental illness.14 Based on
this information, we de￿ne two categories of welfare prone target groups:
￿rst, being a Swedish-born, single mother (with children living at home),
14 Spahic de￿nes long-term recipiency as receiving bene￿ts during at least 10 months
during a period of 2 years, while we look at those that receive welfare bene￿ts during
both 1996 and 1995, or both 1996 and 1993, irrespective of the time on welfare.
16 IFAU ￿E⁄ects of work requirements on welfare migrationand second, being born in a non-Western country15.
The comparison groups for the two sets of target groups are de￿ned
as follows: First, we compare our group of single mothers with single or
cohabiting women without children, as well as with married or cohabiting
mothers.16 As in the case of single mothers, we only include Swedish-
born individuals. Second, we compare individuals born in a non-Western
country with individuals born in a Western country (except Sweden), and
with individuals born in Sweden, respectively. Since it is plausible that
the migration pattern of recent immigrants di⁄ers from other residents￿ ,
we exclude those that have immigrated during the last 3 years from the
sample.17 In addition, during the ￿rst years in the country, refugees are
in general entitled to compensation for participation in Swedish and in-
troductory courses. The compensation is in about the same amount as
the welfare bene￿t level, and is included in our data on welfare bene￿ts.
Unless we exclude recent refugees from the sample, our data will therefore
overstate the likelihood that an individual born in a foreign country is a
recipient of welfare.
Table 3 shows the average welfare participation rates and the average
migration rates for the di⁄erent groups over the period 1994￿ 2003, using
data on all individuals aged 18￿ 65 in the 11 town districts of our sample.
Column 1, Obs, shows the number of observations, and column 2, Welfare,
the share of individuals that receive welfare bene￿ts (of any amount). As
can be seen in the table, the likelihood of being a recipient of welfare
bene￿ts is clearly higher for the more welfare prone groups.
The table also shows the average share that moves from the town dis-
trict during a year, Move out; the average age of the individuals in our
sample, Age; and the average shares with low and high levels of education,
respectively, Low and High. Low education level is de￿ned as having ￿n-
ished at most secondary education, while a high education level is de￿ned
as having ￿nished higher education. There is some variation between the
15 This category contains all countries except Europe, North America and Oceania.
16 The reason for including cohabiting women in the former group, is that our data
does not allow us to separate single women without children from cohabiting women
without children.
17 One reason for this is that the decision of where to settle may change as the
information about the new country increases, and that this may lead to more moves
taking place during the ￿rst years. In addition, refugees to Sweden in the early 1990s
were not free to decide the municipality of placement. They were however free to
move immediately after placement. We can therefore expect some adjustments in the
settlements of refugees, for example moves to municipalities with a large number of
nationals.
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in section 4.3, it is not obvious it is not obvious that we want to control
for these individual characteristics. Our solution is to show results both
with and without controls for the age- and education structure. We will
use age dummy variables, with one dummy for each ￿ve-year age category,
and the education dummy variables equal the variables for low and high
education that are given in the table.
Table 3: Description data on welfare prone and comparison groups.
Comparison group Obs Welfare Move out Age Education
Low High
Single mothers 115,446 0.15 0.06 38.6 0.51 0.24
Single/cohabiting women 264,293 0.05 0.09 39.6 0.49 0.34
without children
Married/cohabiting 258,828 0.04 0.04 38.7 0.47 0.38
mothers
Born in:
Non-western country 314,030 0.29 0.07 37.9 0.41 0.26
Western country 225,525 0.11 0.04 45.8 0.44 0.27
Sweden 1,476,493 0.06 0.06 40.61 0.48 0.32
There is also a considerable variation in sample sizes. The smallest
of the groups, Single mothers, contains about 115,000 observations, while
the largest group, Swedish-born, contains almost 1.5 million observations.
These di⁄erences naturally a⁄ect the likelihood that a signi￿cant result is
obtained. Since the hypothesis to be tested is that the activation program
has an e⁄ect on the target group, but not on the comparison groups, it is
however comfortable that the comparison groups are in all cases but one
larger than the target groups.
5 Graphical analysis
Before moving on to the regression analysis, it is interesting to look at
the migration pattern of the individuals in our sample graphically. By
plotting the yearly outmigration rates from town districts that started
activation programs early and late, and for the di⁄erent target and com-
parison groups, respectively, we can see if a change in the moving choices is
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programs.
We start by dividing the town districts into four groups: The ￿rst
group consists of the early program-starters, Rinkeby and Sk￿rholmen,
who started activation programs in 1998 and 1999. We denote this group
Td99, since we expect to see an e⁄ect on the migration of welfare prone
individuals around 1999 in these districts. The second group is denoted
Td01, for the same reason, and consists of Kista, Farsta and ˜lvsj￿, out
of which Kista and Farsta started activation programs in 2001, and ˜lvsj￿
started a program in 2002. Finally, we construct one group, Td03, with the
town districts that started activation programs in 2003: Sp￿nga-Tensta,
Liljeholmen, and H￿gersten; and one group, Td04, with the town districts
that started activation programs in 2004 (i.e. outside the sample period
of this study): H￿sselby-V￿llingby, Enskede-¯rsta and Vant￿r.
Graphs 1-6, which can be found in the Appendix, show the trends in
the share that moves from the town district for the four groups of town
districts. As in the rest of the paper, only moves within the Stockholm
municipality are included. Separate graphs are shown for each of the
target and control groups.
The graphs give no clear indication of a change in the migration de-
cisions of welfare prone individuals after the introduction of activation
programs in the town district groups. On the contrary, the over-all im-
pression is that the outmigration for the respective group follows relatively
similar trends in the four town district groups.
In spite of the lacking evidence on welfare migration from the graphs,
we move on to the regression analysis, where we have better possibilities
to control for other factors, such as district speci￿c trends that may a⁄ect
the migration choices of individuals.
6 Estimation strategy
As discussed in the previous sections, the data contains di⁄erent sources
of variation ￿between town districts and between groups of individuals.
We start by using the town district variation in a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences
analysis (DD), and then add the group variation in welfare propensity to
construct a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimator (DDD).
Before the law revision of 1998, there was no activation program in any
town district. After 1998, most town districts have chosen to implement
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illustrated in Table 2. This means that we can compare the migration
rates before and after the implementation of activation programs in the
di⁄erent town districts.
It is illustrative to describe this estimation strategy in a table. Let us,
for simplicity, assume that there are only two town districts and two time
periods. Let us also assume that one of the districts, denoted Program,
starts an activation program in period 2, while the other district, No
program, does not. How is outmigration from the Program-district a⁄ected
by the start of the activation program? One way to measure this could
be to look at the di⁄erence in outmigration before and after the program
start, in the town district that starts a program, i.e. (B ￿ A) in Table 4.
This estimate however also captures other factors that change between the
two periods, and is hence likely to give a biased measure of the program-
e⁄ect.
The DD-method is based on the idea that the in￿ uence of other factors
can be controlled for by comparison with a town district which is com-
parable in every aspect that a⁄ects outmigration, but that has not imple-
mented the program. An unbiased estimate of the e⁄ect of the activation
program on outmigration can hence be obtained by taking the di⁄erence
in the migration change over the two periods between the Program-district
and the No Program-district, (B ￿ A) ￿ (D ￿ C).
Table 4: Description Di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences
Period / Town district Before After After-Before
Program A B (B ￿ A)
No program C D (D ￿ C)
Di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences (DD): (B ￿ A) ￿ (D ￿ C)
The DD-estimator in Table 4 hinges on the assumption that any unob-
served trends in migration are the same in both town districts. By adding
the comparison of groups that di⁄er in the propensity to receive welfare
bene￿ts to the analysis, this assumption can be relaxed. This is done by
taking the di⁄erence of the di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences-estimates for the tar-
get and the control group, i.e. DDD = DDT ￿ DDC, as is illustrated in
Table 5. The idea is that the non-welfare prone group will be similarly
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but una⁄ected by the activation program. Subtracting the outmigration
rates of this group will hence control for e⁄ects of unobserved town spe-
ci￿c trends, and the resulting estimate will measure only the e⁄ect of the
activation program. The important assumption in this case is that any
unobserved town district-speci￿c factors a⁄ect the migration-decisions in
both groups similarly.
Which of the approaches, DD or DDD, is more appropriate to use in
this setting? As described above, DDD has the advantage that it controls
for town district speci￿c unobserved migration trends that a⁄ect the wel-
fare prone and the comparison groups alike. Since we cannot rule out that
such trends are present, we will use the DDD-method. However, if the un-
observed migration trends are in fact similar across town districts, adding
the comparison group based comparison to the analysis is an unnecessary
step. We will therefore also show the results of the DD-estimation. As
we shall see in the next sections, both estimators yield fairly similar res-
ults. This is a reassuring result, which suggests that unobserved migration
trends are probably not a big problem in this case. However, none of the
used methods can control for trends that di⁄er both between groups and
regions.
Table 5: Description Di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences
Period / Town district Before After After-Before
Target Program AT BT (BT ￿ AT)
No program CT DT (DT ￿ CT)
DDT : (BT ￿ AT) ￿ (DT ￿ CT)
Control Program AC BC (BC ￿ AC)
No program CC DC (DC ￿ CC)
DDC : (BC ￿ AC) ￿ (DC ￿ CC)
DDD = DDT ￿ DDC : ((BT ￿ AT) ￿ (DT ￿ CT))
￿((BC ￿ AC) ￿ (DC ￿ CC))
The DD- and the DDD-estimators will be used to estimate the e⁄ect
of the activation programs on outmigration from the town districts. The
description above assumed only two town districts and two time periods.
In this study, there are several town districts, and they start activation
programs during di⁄erent years. The intuition behind the DD-estimator
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trols for time-varying factors that a⁄ect all town districts similarly, and
it controls for ￿xed town district characteristics. The DDD-estimator fur-
thermore controls for town district-speci￿c trends, through the inclusion
of district-by-year ￿xed e⁄ects.
The resulting DD-estimation equation, corresponding to Table 4, for
our pooled cross-section for the individuals in 11 town districts over 10
years, is given in equation (7):
probit(moveijt) = ￿0+￿1Aj+￿2Dt+￿3progjt+￿4Xijt+￿5Zjt+"ijt: (7)
In equation (7), the dependent variable moveijt is a dummy variable which
equals one if individual i moves out of town district j in year t, and
zero otherwise. (As was described in the previous sections, only moves
within the municipality of Stockholm are included.) The main explanatory
variable is the dummy variable progjt, which equals one if town district
j has an activation program in year t, and is zero otherwise. A positive
value of ￿3 hence indicates that more individuals move out of the town
district after the start of the program, while a negative coe¢ cient value
indicates that less individuals move out of the district when there is an
activation program in place. Fixed town district e⁄ects are denoted Aj
and year e⁄ects are denoted Dt. Finally, a set of individual covariates for
the age- and education level, Xijt, is included, as well as a set of town
district level covariates, Zjt.
The DDD-estimator that adds the group based comparison to the DD-
estimator and which corresponds to Table 5, is given in equation (8)18:
probit(moveijt) = ￿0 + ￿1Tij + ￿2Aj + ￿3Dt + ￿4 (Tij ￿ Aj)
+￿5 (Tij ￿ Dt) + ￿6 (Aj ￿ Dt) + ￿7progjt
+￿8 (Tij ￿ progjt) + ￿9Xijt + ￿10Zjt + "ijt: (8)
In equation (8), coe¢ cient ￿8 is of primary interest. It measures the
extent to which the migration response to an activation program di⁄ers
between the target and the control group, where the dummy variable Tij
is one if the individual belongs to the more welfare prone target group.
As in equation (7), Aj and Dt denote town district and year speci￿c ￿xed
e⁄ects, Xijt contains individual age- and education dummy variables, and
18 Similar estimation strategies are used in e.g. Yelowitz (1995) and Ruhm (1998).
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includes the second-order interactions between the control group dummy
and the district and year ￿xed e⁄ects, (Tij ￿ Aj) and (Tij ￿ Dt). Finally,
town-district speci￿c year e⁄ects, (Aj ￿ Dt), control for year e⁄ects that
di⁄er between the town districts.
The following section present the results of the estimations of equations
(7) and (8).
7 Results
This following sections show the results from running the estimations de-
scribed in the previous section. Results will be given both for the full
sample of 11 town districts, and for alternative samples.
7.1 Full set of town districts
We start by estimating the DD-equation in (7) on our two groups of welfare
prone individuals: single mothers and individuals born in non-Western
countries, respectively, using the data set on the 11 town districts that were
described in section 4.1. As discussed in the previous sections, we expect
that the moving decisions of welfare prone individuals will be a⁄ected by
the activation program, however, the direction of the e⁄ect will depend on
whether the individual views the program as something primarily negative
or positive.
It is informative to also estimate equation (7) for the control groups.
Since these are less welfare prone than the target groups, we expect to see
smaller e⁄ects of the program on these groups. A di⁄erent result is an
indication either of miss-speci￿cation of the control- and target-groups, or
of bias due to some omitted town district speci￿c factor, which is correlated
with the district￿ s decision to start a program.
The results of the DD-estimations are shown in the ￿rst sections of
Table 6 and 7. The tables show the marginal e⁄ects of the activation
program on the probability to move from the district, for an individual
with average characteristics. The results come from separate regressions
for each target and comparison group. The speci￿cation in column (1)
includes the activation program dummy together with ￿xed town district
speci￿c e⁄ects and year e⁄ects. In speci￿cation (2), the individual age-and
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the town district speci￿c covariates.
Table 6: Probit estimates, marginal e⁄ect of activation program on out-
migration, target and comparison groups based on civil status and moth-
erhood
(1) (2) (3)
DD-estimates Single mothers (SM) -.004 -.005￿￿ -.005￿
(.0028) (.0025) (.0028)
Log pseudolikelihood -26388.706 -24831.946 -24831.708
n=115446 n=114278 n=114278
Single/cohabiting women (SW) .002 -.001 .001
(.0024) (.0022) (.0023)
Log pseudolikelihood -81442.557 -74977.421 -74971.562
n=264293 n=262748 n=262748
Married mothers (MM) -.002 -.003￿￿ -.002
(.0015) (.0013) (.0014)
Log pseudolikelihood -41023.44 -37508.565 -37502.588
n=258828 n=257565 n=257565
DDD-estimates SM-SW -.008￿ -.006
(.0040) (.0037)




Log pseudolikelihood -67364.334 -62364.931
n=374274 n=371843
Controls:
individual level covariates no yes yes
town district level covariates no no yes
Note: The standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroscedasticity. ***,
** and * denote signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Town dis-
trict ￿xed e⁄ects and year ￿xed e⁄ects are included in all speci￿cations. The DDD-
speci￿cations also includes district-by-year-e⁄ects.
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migration, target and comparison groups based on country of birth
(1) (2) (3)
DD-estimates Country of birth:
Non-Western country (NW) -.001 -.002 .001
(.0016) (.0016) (.0017)
Log pseudolikelihood -75683.204 -68675.945 -68666.048
n=314030 n=290012 n=290012
Western country (W) -.002 -.002 .001
(.0016) (.0015) (.0017)
Log pseudolikelihood -39218.682 -35883.777 -35872.489
n=225525 n=214861 n=214861
Sweden (S) -.0003 -.002￿￿ -.0004
(.0008) (.0007) (.0008)
Log pseudolikelihood -332595.55 -307661.89 -307645.74
n=1476493 n=1465322 n=1465322
DDD-estimates NW-W .003 .002
(.0026) (.0025)




Log pseudolikelihood -408140.34 -376864.89
n=1790523 n=1755334
Controls:
individual level covariates no yes yes
town district level covariates no no yes
Note: The standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroscedasticity. ***,
** and * denote signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Town dis-
trict ￿xed e⁄ects and year ￿xed e⁄ects are included in all speci￿cations. The DDD-
speci￿cations also includes district-by-year-e⁄ects.
Table 6 and 7 also show the results from the DDD-estimation in (8).
As was discussed in section 6, an advantage with this approach is that
the di⁄erential e⁄ects that are obtained are not a⁄ected by town district-
speci￿c trends that a⁄ect the target and control group similarly. The
DDD-estimates were obtained by running separate regressions for each
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facilitate the interpretation of the coe¢ cients.
For the DDD-estimator the speci￿cation including town district cov-
ariates is however dropped due to multicollinearity. The e⁄ects of these
variables are probably picked up by the town district-speci￿c year e⁄ects.
The DD-results in Table 6 show a signi￿cant negative marginal ef-
fect of the activation program on outmigration of around -0.005 for single
mothers, when individual characteristics are controlled for. This indicates
that having an activation program reduces the probability that a single
mother, with average characteristics, will move from the town district with
0.5 percentage points. This is a rather large e⁄ect, considering that the
average yearly migration rate for this group is 6 percent. However, we
also see a negative e⁄ect of about similar magnitude for married mothers
in speci￿cation (2), although this e⁄ect is not signi￿cant as town district
covariates are included. This indicates that the negative e⁄ect may not be
due to the activation program, but to some other factor that a⁄ects single
and married mothers alike.
Turning to the DD-estimates in Table 7, we see that negative marginal
program e⁄ects are found also for the target and control groups based on
country of birth, although in this case the e⁄ect is only signi￿cant in
speci￿cation 2 for Swedish-born individuals. (That a signi￿cant e⁄ect is
found for this group is not surprising, considering its large sample size.)
The DD-estimates hence yield negative point estimates for all groups,
except for single/cohabiting women without children. Is it plausible that
this is due to confounding district-speci￿c trends that are correlated with
the introduction of activation programs, and that a⁄ect outmigration in
most of our target and control groups negatively? That is, can it be the
case that the activation programs are started when town districts, for
some reason, experience low outmigration? This is possible, although my
prior beliefs would go the other way: that districts introduce stricter pro-
grams when the economic situation of the district is bad, and outmigration
therefore plausibly high.
Turning to the DDD-estimates, the results in Table 6 show that the
probability to move out of the town district is around 0.8 percentage points
lower for single mothers if there is an activation program in place, com-
pared to single/cohabiting women with no children. This e⁄ect is however
only signi￿cant at the 10 percent level in speci￿cation (1), and turn insig-
ni￿cant as individual characteristics are controlled for. When comparing
26 IFAU ￿E⁄ects of work requirements on welfare migrationsingle and married mothers, no signi￿cant di⁄erences in the program e⁄ect
are found.
The DDD-estimates in Table 7 show a positive outmigration e⁄ect of
the program for individuals born in a non-Western, country compared to
Swedish-born, which is marginally signi￿cant as individual covariates are
included in the speci￿cation. In contrast to the result for single mothers,
this indicates that welfare prone individuals are more likely to move from
a town district that has an activation program, which is consistent with
the hypothesis that recipients of welfare try to avoid the obligation to
participate in the program by moving.
Although it could be the case that there are heterogeneous e⁄ects
of the program on di⁄erent groups of welfare recipients, a more prudent
interpretation of the results is probably preferable. As pointed out by
Meyer (1995), the fact that the results vary with the choice of comparison
group, suggests that the e⁄ects may be due to some comparison group-
speci￿c and district-speci￿c omitted variable that is not controlled for in
our estimations. One way to reduce the risk for this type of bias is to
reduce the sample to districts that are as similar as possible in factors
that are assumed to a⁄ect migration. In the next section, we do this by
selecting only the six poorest of the town districts.
7.2 Sensitivity analysis: varying the set of town districts
7.2.1 Limiting the sample to the six poorest town districts
Table 2 in section 4 showed systematic di⁄erences in the socioeconomic
variables between town districts that implemented activation programs
early after the 1998 law revision, and town districts that implemented
programs late during the period under study. In order to obtain a more
comparable group of districts, we select only the six poorest town dis-
tricts and re-run the DDD-estimations using this sample. The resulting
town districts are: Rinkeby, Sk￿rholmen, Farsta, Kista, Sp￿nga-Tensta
and Vant￿r. As can be seen in Table 2, essential variation in the starting
year for the activation program is kept in this sample: two of the town
districts implement the program in 1998 and -99, two in 2001, and the
remaining two in 2003 and 2004. The DDD-results for this sample are
shown in Table 8.19
19 Note that the abbreviations used in the table are the same as in Table 6 and 7.
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migration, six town districts
(1) (2)
DDD-estimates SM-SW -.006 -.004
(.0053) (.0048)




Log pseudolikelihood -29805.839 -27764.847
n=166058 n=164551
DDD-estimates NW-W -.001 -.001
(.0030) (.0030)




Log pseudolikelihood -187684.7 -172546.45
n=866440 n=840647
Controls:
individual level covariates no yes
town district level covariates no no
Note: The standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroscedasticity. ***, **
and * denote signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Town district
￿xed e⁄ects, year ￿xed e⁄ects, and district-by-year-e⁄ects are included in all speci￿ca-
tions.
As can be seen in Table 8, the marginal e⁄ects are fairly similar to the
full-sample estimates of the previous section, but are never signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero. This can be due to the fact that the estimation power
is reduced because of the smaller number of observations. It can however
also be the case that the signi￿cant e⁄ects that were obtained in some
speci￿cations in the previous section, were due to some omitted factor
that was related to di⁄erences in the economic situation between early
and late program starters.
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The previous sections yield rather ambiguous results: some signi￿cant,
albeit not too easily interpretable, e⁄ects are obtained when all eleven
town districts are included. However, when only the six poorest of the
town districts are analyzed, no signi￿cant e⁄ects of the program are found.
An issue to consider in light of these results, is that the design of
the activation programs vary between town districts, as was commented
in section 2. This means that the activation programs can di⁄er in for
example the number of hours of attendance that are required, or in the
quality of the services that are o⁄ered in the program. This naturally
a⁄ects the results.
In a ￿nal attempt to pin down the e⁄ects of stricter activation rules
on migration, we select two districts that are as similar as possible in
economic conditions, but that di⁄er as much as possible in the strictness
of the activation policy. The selected town districts are Sk￿rholmen and
Vant￿r. As can be seen in Table 2, these are fairly similar in all variables
except the share of immigrants. However, Sk￿rholmen can be described
as having one of the stricter activation programs. As was described in
section 2, it has among the highest requirement for the number of hours
of attendance (a minimum of 3 h a day). In addition, as was discussed
in section 3, studies point to a lack of resources to meet the needs of the
program participants, as well as to more negative attitudes to the program
among the participants compared to other town districts (see Blomberg
et al. (2006) and ThorØn (2005)). This suggests that recipients of welfare
would probably prefer not to have to participate in the program. Vant￿r,
on the other hand, has no activation program during the time period under
study.20 If there is a positive e⁄ect on outmigration of stricter rules in the
form of activation programs, it is thus likely to turn up here.
The DDD-results for this sample of town districts are shown in Table
9.21 As can be seen in the table, they show no evidence of a migration
e⁄ect of the activation program when we compare single mothers with
single/cohabiting women with no children, or with married mothers. The
di⁄erential migration e⁄ect for being a single mother, compared with a
single woman with no children, is marginally signi￿cant in speci￿cation
(1), but not as individual covariates are included. The coe¢ cient for
20 As could be seen in Table 1, an activation program was started in Vant￿r in 2004.
21 Note that the abbreviations used in the table are the same as in Table 6 and 7.
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signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
Table 9: Probit estimates, marginal e⁄ect of activation program on out-
migration, two town districts
(1) (2)
DDD-estimates SM-SW -.015 -.012
(.0085)￿ (.0078)




Log pseudolikelihood -11671.782 -10890.232
n=61131 n=60714
DDD-estimates NW-W -.013 -.014
(.0047)￿￿￿ (.0045)￿￿￿




Log pseudolikelihood -68705.251 -63300.987
n=298062 n=291709
Controls:
individual level covariates no yes
town district level covariates no no
Note: The standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroscedasticity. ***, **
and * denote signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Town district
￿xed e⁄ects, year ￿xed e⁄ects, and district-by-year-e⁄ects are included in all speci￿ca-
tions.
A negative signi￿cant marginal e⁄ect is however estimated when in-
dividuals born in non-Western country and a Western country (except
Sweden) are compared. This suggests that individuals of non-Western
origin are about 2 percentage points less likely to move from a town dis-
trict when there is an activation program in place, compared to individuals
of Western origin. This is a large e⁄ect considering that the average mi-
gration rate for these groups in the full sample are 0.04 and 0.07 (see Table
30 IFAU ￿E⁄ects of work requirements on welfare migration3). The e⁄ect is in line with the hypothesis that welfare prone individuals
value the services of the program, and hence want to stay in the town
district to a higher extent when the program is in place, i.e. not the res-
ult we expected considering the negative attitudes among the activation
program participants that were expressed in Blomberg et al. (2006). How-
ever, in order to make this interpretation, we would like to see a similar
result for the di⁄erence in migration response when using Swedish-born
individuals as comparison group. Whereas there is a marginally signi￿cant
e⁄ect in speci￿cation (1), this turns insigni￿cant as individual covariates
are included.
8 Concluding remarks
To conclude, we ￿nd some evidence indicating that the more welfare prone
target groups are less likely to move from a town district that has an
activation program, compared to the less welfare prone comparison groups.
This result is primarily obtained in the comparison between single mothers
and single/cohabiting women without children in the regression on 11 town
districts, and in the comparison between non-Western-born and Western-
born individuals in the regression on two town districts. This could be
interpreted as evidence that welfare prone individuals are more likely to
stay in town districts that have an activation program, possibly because
they value the services of the program.
However, the over-all results suggest that this is too strong an inter-
pretation of the results. While signi￿cant di⁄erences in the e⁄ects on more
and less welfare prone individuals are obtained in several speci￿cations,
these vary with the choice of comparison group as well as with the sample
of town districts, and it is hence probably wiser not to interpret the results
as a result of the di⁄erences in local welfare bene￿t policy.
What we can say, however, is that the aggregate results show no evid-
ence of a positive e⁄ect of the activation program on the outmigration of
welfare prone individuals from the town districts, i.e. it does not seem
that welfare prone individuals avoid the obligations to participate in the
programs by moving. This is a reassuring result, which means that let-
ting the town districts decide on the implementation and design of the
activation programs has not led to harmful welfare-migration e⁄ects.
The non-signi￿cant results of this study contrast to the signi￿cant,
albeit often economically small, e⁄ects found in other studies of welfare
IFAU ￿E⁄ects of work requirements on welfare migration 31migration. What is the reason for this divergence? It is of course possible
that the lack of welfare migration is speci￿c to the sample used in this
case. However, it is also possible that the di⁄erence in results is due to an
omitted variable bias in the previous literature, which is not present in this
study. As was explained in the introduction, the fact that this study uses
variation in the welfare policy within a municipality, where that labour
market conditions and other region-speci￿c characteristics are the same
for all individuals, greatly reduces the risk for omitted variable bias.
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A.1 Survey to the social service units of the town districts
(Note that the survey was conducted in Swedish, and that this is a trans-
lated version.)
The survey refers to information on activities for unemployed individu-
als, capable of working, that receive welfare bene￿ts.
1. Does your town district currently have activation or other labour
market related programs for unemployed individuals that are capable of
working and that receive welfare bene￿ts?
Yes
No
If no, turn to question 9 of the survey.
If yes, please name the program/programs:
2. Since which year does this program/programs exist in its current
form (under the same or a di⁄erent name)?
3. Does the program/s encompass all individuals, capable of working,
that are unemployed and receive welfare bene￿ts?
Yes
No
4. If you have responded "No" to question 3:
- How large a share of all individuals, capable of working, that are
unemployed and receive welfare bene￿t are encompassed by the program?
- Which groups of individuals are targeted by the program?
5. Please specify how and to which extent the following activities are
being used in the program/programs:
a. Job-seeking activities
b. Job training activities
c. Other assigned work (for example within the municipal services)
d. Other activities, please specify which:
6. What is the minimum number of hours of weekly attendance that
is required in the program/programs?









In the following part of the survey we ask for information on programs
that were targeted to unemployed individuals that are capable of working
and receive welfare bene￿ts, before today￿ s program/programs started.
9. Which programs have been in place under the period from 1990
until the start of today￿ s program/programs? Under each number below,
please specify the name of the program, or the main activity if a name
does not exist, for example "Meeting with job counsellor￿ . Please also








Below follows a set of questions about the programs/activities that
were in place before today￿ s program/programs. Please, answer the ques-
tions about each program under the number that corresponds to the list
above.
Program/Activity 1:
1. Which groups were targeted by the program/activity?
36 IFAU ￿E⁄ects of work requirements on welfare migration2. How large a share of all individuals, capable of working and receiving
welfare bene￿ts, were encompassed by the program/activity?




c. Other assigned work (for example within the municipal services)
d. Other activities, please specify which:
7. Was absence systematically reported to the social service o¢ cials?
Yes
No
If yes, in which way:





[The same set of questions were repeated for all programs/activities in the list.]
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